Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective by Foer, Albert A.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 51 Number 4 Article 6 
10-1-2003 
Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective 
Albert A. Foer 
The American Antitrust Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Albert A. Foer, Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 1029 
(2003). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol51/iss4/6 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ 
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Putting the Antitrust Modernization
Commission into Perspective
ALBERT A. FOERt
Congress has enacted a law to establish the Antitrust
Modernization Commission1 ("AMC"). Although Congress
has not yet appropriated funds, there is a general
expectation that funding will occur late in 2003.2
Meanwhile, some of the Commissioners have already been
appointed,3 and so it is probably worthwhile to begin
thinking about how the AMC might go about its work. In
this Essay, we first set out the statutory framework for the
AMC. Next, we put this latest antitrust study commission
into historical perspective, by recalling its predecessors: the
1938-41 Temporary National Economic Commission, the
1955 Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws, the 1969 White House Task Force on
Antitrust Policy (producing the "Neal Report"), the 1979
National Commission to Review Antitrust Law and
Procedures, and the 1998 International Competition Policy
Advisory Committee. Finally, in light of prior history, we
t President, The American Antitrust Institute. The author served as stand-in
for FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk on the National Commission for Review
of Antitrust Laws and Procedures. The author thanks Hiromitsu Miyakawa, an
AAI Research Fellow, for his contributions on the 1955 and 1969 commissions,
and Spencer Weber Waller of Loyola Chicago Law School, for his suggestions
regarding the TNEC.
1. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).
2. The authorization is for $4 million over the three-year life of the
Commission; however, a lesser amount could actually be appropriated. If there
is no appropriation, there will be no Commission. As of September 12, 2003,
according to various sources, the House had committed to $1.5 million for the
first year's operations and the Senate was expected to provide some level of
funding.
3. As of September 12, 2003, appointees by the Democrats were John
Shenefield, Debra Valentine, John Yarowsky, and John Jacobson. Appointees
by the Republicans in the Senate were Steve Cannon and Makan Delrahim.
There will yet be two Republicans appointed by the House and the White House
will appoint four members.
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propose an approach for the AMC, first in terms of a
process, then in terms of specific topics for substantive
consideration.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The specified duties of the AMC are only four:
(1) to examine whether the need exists to modernize the antitrust
laws and to identify and study related issues; (2) to solicit views of
all parties concerned with the operation of the antitrust laws; (3)
to evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrangements
with respect to any issues so identified; and (4) to prepare and to
submit to Congress and the President a report.
The report must be submitted not later than three
years after the first meeting of the Commission, and shall
contain detailed findings and conclusions, together with
recommendations for legislative or administrative action.5
The AMC will have twelve members, four appointed by
the President;' two by the majority leader of the Senate;
two by the minority leader of the Senate; two by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives; and two by the
minority leader of the House of Representatives. 7 Before
appointing members, the appointers are required to consult
with each other "to ensure fair and equitable representation
4. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, §
11053. There is no legislative history to speak of, as the bill, H.R. 2325, was
inserted as an amendment at the last moment. At various times, Chairman F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Republican from Wisconsin) the Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee and father of the Antitrust Modernization
Commission, spoke of the need to study the intersections of antitrust and (1)
high technology, (2) intellectual property, and (3) international law. Sources
said the idea was modeled after the National Bankruptcy Review Commission.
Jaret Sieberg, Bill Calls for Blue-Ribbon Antitrust Panel (Feb. 16, 2001),
available at http://www.thedeal.com (copy on file with author).
5. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, §
11058.
6. "[N]o more than [two] of the [four] shall be of the same political party ....
The President shall appoint members of the opposing party only on the
recommendation of the leaders of Congress from that party. Id. § 11054(a)(1).
7. Members of Congress are ineligible for appointment. Id. § 11054(b). A
member of the Commission who is an officer or employee of a government is
eligible to serve, but without additional pay or benefits. Non-government
members are entitled to be paid for each day during which such member is
engaged in the actual performance of duties of the Commission, at the rate of
Level IV of the Executive Schedule." Id. § 11055(a).
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of various points of view in the Commission."8 The
President will select the chairperson from among the
members and the leaders of Congress from the opposing
party will select the vice-chairperson from among the
remaining members. The chairperson may appoint and
terminate an executive director, and may fix the
compensation of the executive director and the staff.9 The
Commission may procure the services of experts and
consultants," hold hearings, and administer oaths to
witnesses." It may request and obtain information from any
executive agency.
Four generalizations seem appropriate from this
review. First, the statute gives almost no direction as to the
focus of the AMC. It will be entirely up to the Commission
itself to define its scope and priorities. This task will be the
first to confront the new Commissioners.
Second, Congress sought to create a Commission that
would be balanced politically and representative of a wide
range of views. However, whether this will be achieved
ultimately depends on the appointments-both the
Commissioners and the staff and the experts or
consultants-that are actually made.
Third, if one early decision is critical, it will be the
President's identification of the chairperson, primarily
because it will be the chairperson who controls the
executive director and staff. The members will be part-
timers whose agenda, priorities, spending choices, and
report wording will be strongly influenced by the full-time
staff.
And fourth, the AMC's ability to hold a large number of
meetings, hear substantial amounts of testimony, obtain
the specialized help of experts, and recruit a top quality
8. Id. § 11054(h).
9. Id. § 11056(a). The appointment of an executive director shall be subject
to approval by the Commission. Id. § 11056(a)(1).
10. Id. § 11056(b). Selecting experts and consultants will likely be of great
importance in determining whether the Report is seen to be balanced and
objective.
11. Id. § 11057(a).
12. Id. § 11057(b). Somewhat oddly, the Antitrust Division, the Federal
Trade Commission, and the States are not represented on the Commission.
(Makan Delrahim was a member of the Senate staff when he was appointed,
but has since become employed by the Antitrust Division.) Some have suggested
that this may undermine the law enforcement agencies' incentive for diverting
their resources to the assistance of the Commission.
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staff will all be influenced by the amount of funding that
Congress eventually appropriates. Four million dollars is a
drop in the federal bucket, and will not pay for a lavishly
operated Commission; but will Congress make even this
limited funding available for a study of antitrust at this
particular time in history and in light of a statute that is so
open-ended as to its very purpose?
II. THE PAST AS PROLOGUE
This will not be the first study commission to be
assigned to make a broad-ranging review of the status of
the antitrust laws. In fact, the American antitrust
community has gone through similar processes at least five
times, including as recently as 1998. What can we learn
from experience?
A. The Temporary National Economic Committee (1938-41)
The Temporary National Economic Committee
("TNEC") began to hold hearings in 1938, about the same
time that Thurman Arnold was starting to revitalize the
Antitrust Division in the second New Deal. Its final report
was issued in 1941.1' This was a period of economic crisis
and little agreement on what direction the government
should take. The Administration was split between those
who favored planning and those who favored antitrust.
President Roosevelt addressed Congress on April 29, 1938,
with a message that the country was suffering from a
"concentration of private power without equal in history."
[H]e recommended [that] Congress should appropriate more
money for antitrust enforcement; it should pass legislation to
control bank holding companies; and it should provide a sum of
$500,000 for a 'thorough study of the concentration of economic
power,' a study that would include such items as antitrust
procedure, the merger movement, financial controls, trade
13. Interestingly, although he was a Member of the TNEC representing the
Justice Department, Thurman Arnold distanced himself from it. According to
Spencer Weber Waller, who is writing a biography of Arnold, "[h]e was not
deeply involved in the TNEC either in the planning or the hearing (except at
the very beginning)... Arnold ultimately regarded the whole enterprise as a
waste of time relative to case investigation and focused on that aspect of his job
and delegated TNEC work to his subordinates." Personal correspondence from
Spencer Weber Waller to Albert A. Foer (June 15, 2003) (on file with author).
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association activities, patent laws, tax revision, and the feasibility
of a Bureau of Industrial Economics.14
As New Deal historian Ellis Hawley described TNEC's
legislative genesis, "[mien of widely divergent views-
antimonopolists, economic planners, proponents of business
rationalization, and advocates of compensatory spending-
could all agree that an investigation might do some good.
And even if it did not, it could not do much harm."15
In Congress, most of the debate centered on the
question of legislative versus executive control, not the
desirability of the investigation itself. Senator Joseph
O'Mahoney, who emerged as the leading sponsor of the
TNEC legislation and then became chairman of the TNEC,
modified the President's proposal by giving legislators a
role. His resolution, which formed the basis for the law,
included a committee of eleven, three from the Senate,
three from the House, and one each from the SEC, the FTC,
and the Departments of Justice, Labor, and the Treasury.
The Commerce Department was later added, so that the
membership was evenly balanced between Congress and
the Administration.16 When actual appointments were
made, it was clear that antimonopolists had secured a
majority of the positions, but there was tremendous
diversity of opinion not only among the official members,
but also among the committee's key personnel, the
alternate members (these included some important heavy
weight thinkers and doers), 7 and the research directors. 8
TNEC conducted hearings in 1938, 1939, and 1940.
Senator O'Mahoney kept insisting that the inquiry was an
economic study, not a political inquisition, and the hearings
14. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 412
(1966) [hereinafter HAWLEY]. Another important source on the TNEC is chapter
six of ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM (1966) [hereinafter BRINKLEY].
15. HAWLEY, supra note 14, at 406.
16. Id. at 413-14; see also CHARLES R. GEISST, MONOPOLIES IN AMERICA 162
(2000) [hereinafter GEISST] ("The TNEC was unique since it was composed of
representatives of both houses of Congress as well as the executive branch. In
that respect, it looked more like a federal agency than a committee.").
17. One of whom was the economist Robert Nathan, whose set of report
volumes the author now owns. Brinkley says that many of the administration
alternatives played as significant a role as the full members. BRINKLEY, supra
note 14, at 124.
18. HAWLEY, supra note 14, at 415-16.
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were said to be characterized by their seriousness.19 There
was little in the way of harassment of business, indulgence
in publicity stunts, or other actions to offend the business
community. Businesses reluctantly cooperated. The debate
on policy continued through the period of the hearings, as
the TNEC compiled a massive study of the business system,
described by one historian as "the most dramatic and
sweeping investigation of American industry ever
undertaken."2 Witnesses presented testimony and were
examined about all aspects of the economy, including, for
example, income and wages, trade associations, antitrust,
textiles, insurance, and so on.
Ultimately, hearings were published in twenty-nine
parts (eleven bound volumes), including tables, charts,
graphs, maps, illustrations, and more. Another twenty
volumes of monographs, prepared by experts in their fields,
were also published. Many resources went into this
production. According to Wagner, for instance:
Fully one-third of the [Federal Trade] Commission's economic
reports activity from 1938 to 1941 was devoted to the preparation
of testimony, exhibits, and special reports for the TNEC
investigations. The Commission also prepared monographs on the
basing-point problem, the natural gas industry, and the relative
efficiency of large, medium-sized, and small businesses.
2 1
19. Brinkley concluded that there was a "vaguely dutiful quality to much of
the investigation. Seldom did the hearings themselves crackle with the kind of
fervor or anger that gave other great investigations ... their claim to public
attention. Almost never did examination of witnesses depart from a respectful
tone of academic information gathering to produce any real argument or
debate." BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 126. But according to Geisst, "[t]here were
also elements of witch-hunting in the TNEC testimonies. Part of the lengthy
proceedings were devoted to testimony about racketeering, although the avowed
purpose of the hearings was to study the concentration of economic power."
GEISST, supra note 16, at 164.
20. SUSAN WAGNER, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 81 (Ernest S. Griffith
& Hugh Langdon Elsbree eds., 1971) [hereinafter WAGNER]. Political scientist
Marc Allen Eisner also concluded, "The TNEC hearings resulted in the most
detailed analyses of the American economy ever conducted." MARC ALLEN
EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS 77 (1991). Brinkley credits
TNEC with producing "what is arguably the most thorough, and certainly the
most voluminous, study of the structure of the American economy, and of its
monopolistic elements in particular, ever undertaken by any single
organization." BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 126.
21. WAGNER, supra note 20, at 81.
1034 [Vol. 51
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What was the ultimate contribution of the TNEC?
Professor Hawley writes in The New Deal and the Problem
of Monopoly:
In the beginning the agency had hopes of finding some magic
formula that would cure the nation's ills to the satisfaction of
everyone .... When it came time to write the final report,
however, the mountain of facts had failed to produce any magic
formula, and the policy conflict with which the Committee had
begun was still unresolved. Each faction continued to view the
problem from the standpoint of its own value judgments and to
stick with its own ideas concerning the origins of monopoly, the
extent and effects of it, and the remedial action that should be
taken. The result was a report as timid as it was unoriginal. About
all that a majority of the Committee could agree upon were some
minor changes in the antitrust laws and minor reforms in patent
procedures, and few of these were ever implemented.
2 2
In retrospect, Hawley observes that the TNEC was not
so much a victory for the antitrusters as it was a way of
avoiding the issue, a means of minimizing the policy conflict
within the Administration and postponing any final
decision.
Essentially, the TNEC was a harmless device that could be used
by each group to urge a specific line of action or no action at
all.... In practice, the investigation became largely an effective
duplicate of the frustrating debate that produced it, and by the
time its report was filed, the circumstances had changed. Most of
the steam had gone out of the monopoly issue, and antitrust
sentiment was being replaced by war-induced patriotism.
2 3
Brinkley largely concurs. "In the end," he writes, "the
inquiry was notable above all for its conceptual poverty on
the monopoly issue: for its inability to produce any coherent
prescription for dealing with the problem .... It had
22. HAWLEY, supra note 14, at 464-65.
23. Id. at 488. Or, as Geisst summarized, "[tihe recommendations made by
the TNEC after it finished its investigation in 1941 were very broad and
sometimes vague. The committee did not propose or endorse any specific
legislation. Antitrust and monopoly measures were roundly approved by most
members of the commission but remained unspecific. The real purpose of the
hearings was to expose the structure of the economy more than to remedy it."
GEISST, supra note 16, at 165.
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gathered the data. It would be up to others to decide how to
use it."24
A more positive view is taken by antitrust historian
Rudolph J.R. Peritz. He places the TNEC, along with the
tenure of Thurman Arnold as head of the Antitrust
Division, in the context of the Roosevelt Administration's
move away from the NRA's corporatism and toward an
adversarial relationship with business. Peritz focuses in
particular on one of the TNEC studies, "the influential
TNEC No. 13, entitled 'Relative Efficiency of Large,
Medium-Sized, and Small Business' (1941)." The study,
says Peritz, pointed "to the consumer as the rightful
beneficiary of public policy in the later New Deal."25 It
influenced New Deal policy makers to question the view
that corporate size and industrial trade organization
produced efficiency. Peritz also credits TNEC with
emphasizing economic concentration and economic power
(not market power), leading ultimately to the Celler-
Kefauver Act's amendments to the Clayton Act, which
strengthened the law against anticompetitive mergers.26
B. The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955)
Within a few years after TNEC, writes Brinkley,
"concern about monopoly and commitment to expanding the
regulatory and administrative functions of the state had
largely disappeared from liberal rhetoric."27 But antitrust
was not dead. Cases were being brought with regularity
24. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 127. Brinkley says that "[w]ithin a year of
the TNEC's disbandment, discussion of its findings and recommendations on
the monopoly issue had all but disappeared from public discourse." Id. at 128.
He attributes credit to TNEC, however, for serving "quite deliberately, as a
forum for promoting aggressive federal fiscal policies as a solution to the
nation's economic torpor." Id.
25. RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992:
HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 159 (rev. ed. 2000).
26. Id. at 196-97; see also WAGNER, supra note 20, at 94 ("Politicians and
government officials, schooled in the TNEC and influenced by revival of
antitrust during the 'golden era' of the New Deal, pushed for stronger antitrust
laws, particularly for a new antimerger statute.").
27. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 136. Antitrust, he quotes Richard
Hofstadter, was becoming "one of the faded passions of American reform." Id. at
136.
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and in 1950 the Clayton Act was strengthened by the
Celler-Kefauver Act.
The Eisenhower Administration appointed the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study Antitrust Laws
("Committee") to "provide an important instrument to
prepare the way for modernizing and strengthening our
laws to preserve American free enterprise against monopoly
and unfair competition," 8 and to set out "as clear as
possible the path antitrust has traveled and what it augurs
for the future."" The Committee was co-chaired by Stanley
N. Barnes, the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust,
and Professor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim of the University
of Michigan Law School, and included fifty-nine leading
antitrust lawyers and economists, government officials and
law professors." The Report, released in 1955, was basically
descriptive, an examination of all facets of antitrust
doctrine and enforcement, but not an empirical analysis of
the impact of antitrust on the economy."
The Report examined the whole landscape of the
antitrust laws of 1955. It reflected a high degree of
consensus among antitrust experts2 and pronounced that
"the health of antitrust is good. 33 Although the Report
suggested no legislative changes (except for some
amendments to the Robinson-Patman Act), it asserted that
the antitrust statutes were open to reinterpretation
resulting from extra-legislative sources. 4 The Committee
believed that "the federal agencies and courts would be the
agencies of change without legislative help.
35
28. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS, at iv (1955).
29. Id.
30. See Thomas E. Kauper, The Report of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws: A Retrospective, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1867, 1867-68 (2002) [hereinafter Kauper]. Economists were "a relatively small
fraction of the group." Id.
31. Id. at 1869.
32. Spencer Weber Waller, Symposium, Cultural Conceptions of
Competition: Article: Antitrust and American Business Abroad Today, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 1251, 1260 (1995).
33. Kauper, supra note 30, at 1871.
34. Rudolph J. Peritz, The Predicament of Antitrust Jurisprudence:
Economics and the Monopolization of Price Discrimination Argument, 1984
DUKE L.J., 1205, 1228 (1984).
35. Kauper, supra note 30, at 1871.
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Two aspects of the Attorney General's Report stood out.
First, it was primarily concerned with distribution issues,
such as refusal to deal, tying, and exclusive dealing, and the
Robinson-Patman Act, suggesting amendments to the
latter. Second, it contemplated that, except for "the existing
and well-established per se rules with respect to horizontal
and vertical price fixing, relatively harsh treatment of tying
arrangements and an ambiguity as to whether concerted
refusals to deal should be per se illegal (they are to be
viewed as 'routine unreasonable restraints'), Standard Oil's
rule of reason is to govern cases under section one of the
Sherman Act."36
While it cannot be said that the Report had much
influence on today's antitrust, the Antitrust Civil Process
Act of 1962"7 followed its proposals.38
Professor Thomas E. Kauper summarized the 1955
Attorney General's Report in a recent article:
It confirms that there is a constancy to the core of antitrust.
Having detoured and experimented with new per se rules in the
sixties and seventies, we have confined the use of such rules today
to what they were in 1955. The rule of reason governs under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The general standards under section
2 remain the same, although in some cases somewhat more precise
standards have developed.
Antitrust in 1955 was far simpler than it is today. Fewer cases, no
guidelines, and little economic analysis cluttered things up. But
for all of that, the core of antitrust has worked its way back to that
which the Report describes. If Committee members reviewed the
antitrust world of 2002 they would be pleased, even though if
candid they would admit that their Report probably had little to do
with it. They sought a world governed primarily by the rule of
reason. And that is where we are today. Today's rule of reason
36. Id. at 1871-72. One other commentator stated that "the Report's 'central
core' is a 'modern view of the Sherman Act [that] can start with Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911),' " and that "[a]ccording to
the committee, the opinion's rule of reason 'clarified prior doubts about the
relationship between the Sherman Act and the common law, and defined the
connection between Section 1 and 2 offenses." Peritz, supra note 34, at 1224.
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1994).
38. Kauper, supra note 30, at 1875-76.
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may be truncated, structured or quick look, but it is still the rule
of reason. And it dominates much of antitrust analysis today.39
C. The White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy
(the "Neal Report") (1967-69)
The White House Task Force Report on Antitrust
Policy," known as the Neal Report, was submitted to
President Johnson in July 1968, and released in May 1969.
The Task Force was appointed in December 1967, chaired
by Phil C. Neal, dean of the University of Chicago Law
School. The members of the Task Force were three
practicing lawyers, three economists and six lawprofessors. 4"
Unlike the TNEC, an open-ended legislative vehicle
aimed at information gathering, and unlike the Attorney
General's National Committee, an administrative initiative
focused vaguely on modernization of the antitrust laws, the
White House Task Force was an administrative vehicle
with a mandate "to identify the most important areas in
which antitrust policy might be strengthened by new
legislative or administrative measures."42 It made a number
of recommendations, including: (1) "specific legislation on
the subject of oligopolies, or highly concentrated
industries"; (2) "additional legislation prohibiting mergers
in which a very large firm acquires one of the leading firms
in a concentrated industry"; (3) "a thorough revision of the
Robinson-Patman Act to remove features that unduly
restrict the free play of competitive forces"; (4) "legislation
to establish the principle that a patent which has been
licensed to one person shall be made available to all other
qualified applicants on equivalent terms"; and (5) steps "to
improve the quality and availability of economic and
39. Id. at 1896, 1898-99.
40. White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, BNA ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP., No. 411, May 27, 1969, Part II, at 1 [hereinafter NEAL
REPORT].
41. The members were William F. Baxter, Robert H. Bork, Carl H. Fulda,
William K. Jones, Dennis G. Lyons, Paul W. MacAvoy, James W. McKie, Lee E.
Preston, James A. Rahl, George D. Reycraft, Richard E. Sherwood, S. Paul
Posner. See Richard Schmalensee, Symposium: Bill Baxter in the Antitrust
Arena: An Economist's Appreciation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1317, 1319-20 (1999).
42. NEAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 291.
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financial data relevant to the formulation of antitrust
policy, the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the
operation of competitive markets."43
The Neal Report is most famous for endorsing
legislation to break up oligopolies or high market
concentrations, focusing on market structure rather than
anticompetitive behavior or consumer welfare." The
proposed "Concentrated Industries Act" would have
established criteria and procedures for the effective
reduction of industrial concentration. 5
The Neal Report proposed dramatic legislative
recommendations to achieve deconcentration and generated
a great deal of discussion but no successful legislative
initiatives. Professor William E. Kovacic suggested that the
Justice Department's challenge to IBM's dominant position
in the electronic computer manufacturing market on the
final day of the Johnson Administration may have been the
first result of the report's strong market structure
orientation.46 Other structural cases followed.
Subsequently, a second commission, a group of
University of Chicago academics led by George Stigler,
taking issue with Dean Neal, wrote a report for the
incoming Nixon administration (the "Stigler Report") and
denounced the feasibility of attacking conglomerates using
the existing antitrust laws. 7  Although the Nixon
Administration did not release the Stigler Report and
seemed to base its anti-conglomerate policies on the Neal
43. Id. at 292-94.
44. See Schmalensee, supra note 41, at 1320; see also Peritz, op. cit. supra
note 34, at 233; GEISST, op. cit. supra note 16, at 240-241.
45. The proposed legislation, endorsed by eleven of the thirteen members of
the Task Force, was designed to reduce concentration in any industry in which
"any four or fewer firms had an aggregate market share of 70% or more during
at least seven of the ten and four of the most recent five base years." ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, 176-77 (1978). A
related recommendation would have supplemented section seven of the Clayton
Act to prevent large conglomerate firms from acquiring leading firms in
concentrated industries. NEAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 293.
46. William E. Kovacic, Symposium: The Sherman Act's First Century: A
Historical Perspective, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain
Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105,
1119 (1989); see also PERITZ, supra note 25, at 233 ("The anticoncentration
policy subtending the NEAL REPORT, the Merger Guidelines, and recent
Supreme Court doctrine provoked a series of cases designed to arrest pending
conglomerate mergers.").
47. See GEISST, supra note 16, at 240.
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Report, Robert Bork, who had served on the Neal task force,
and other Chicago School adherents continue to attack the
Neal Report as a kind of icon of what they consider to be
wrongheaded structuralism."
D. The National Commission for Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures (NCRALP) (1977-79)
The National Commission for Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures ("NCRALP" here but sometimes also
referred to as "The Shenefield Commission" after its able
chair), unlike the TNEC or the AMC, but like the 1955 and
1968 committees, was a Justice Department initiative. It
was established by Executive Order of President Jimmy
Carter49 and was chaired by the Assistant Attorney General
for Antitrust, John Shenefield (who has been named to the
AMC). It was staffed by Antitrust Division employees. The
NCRALP consisted of twenty-two members appointed by
the President, including the Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust, the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission
(Michael A. Pertschuk), one other independent regulatory
agency chairman (Alfred E. Kahn of the Civil Aeronautics
Board), five members of the Senate, five members of the
House, one judge, one state representative, and the
remainder from the private sector.""
48. See PERITZ, supra note 25, at 233; see also ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 125 (1978) (stating that the issue between the Neal Report and his
opinion is "simply the way in which efficiencies are to be given weight by the
law"). The enduring controversy of the Neal Report is reflected in the attention
that it receives even in the 2001 edition of RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW,
104 (2d ed. 2001), concluding that the Neal Report's proposed act "assigns far
too much weight to the single fact of concentration by ignoring all the other
considerations."
49. Exec. Order No. 12,022, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,441 (1977) (establishing the
National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures). This
was amended on April 7, 1978 by Exec. Order 12,052, 43 Fed. Reg. 15133, which
expanded the number of Commissioners from fifteen to twenty-two.
50. The Senators were Edward M. Kennedy, Jacob K. Javits, Howard
Metzenbaum, Robert Morgan, and Orrin G. Hatch. Congresspersons were Peter
W. Rodino, Barbara C. Jordan, Robert McClory, John F. Seiberling, and Charles
Wiggins. The Judge was C. Clyde Atkins. Others were Chauncey H. Browning,
Jr. (Attorney General of West Virginia, representing state government),
Maxwell M. Blecher, Eleanor M. Fox, John Izard, James M. Nicholson, Craig
Spangenberg, Gordon B. Spivak, and Lawrence A. Sullivan. Today's Advisory
Board of the American Antitrust Institute includes Shenefield, Kahn,
Metzenbaum, Fox, Blecher, and Sullivan. Senators Kennedy and Hatch, both
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The mandate of the NCRALP was relatively
circumscribed and specific,' summarized by President
Carter as covering two main policy areas: "the unreasonable
protraction of some complex antitrust cases and the need
for reevaluation of existing immunities and exemptions
from the antitrust laws. ',51 In contrast to the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
which had run from 1953 to 1955, only six months was
allocated for completion of the NCRALP's study, with
another thirty days for preparation of a report."
The Commission devoted its first month to
informational hearings on the major subject areas within
its charter. The public was invited to submit papers and the
staff was given research assignments, including the
preparation of options papers. Over seventy witnesses
participated, additional papers were submitted by
individuals and groups, and various lawyers from the
private bar undertook pro bono projects to support the
Commission's efforts. A consultant, supervised by a
committee of Commissioners particularly expert in
litigation, was retained to prepare an empirical study of
complex antitrust litigation.
After the initial hearings, the Commission decided on
its agenda, selecting seven areas of antitrust immunity for
coverage in the report and three-surface transportation,
insurance, and agriculture-for additional hearings. In all,
the Commission met on thirteen days to receive public
testimony from 169 witnesses. Over 200 written
submissions were received, including the consultant's
report on protracted cases, lengthy interviews with judges
and lawyers, and reports of the Ethics Panel, Economic
Advisory Panel, and Business Advisory Panel. The
serving on the Senate Judiciary Committee, are the only NCRALP
Commissioners still in the Congress.
51. The Executive Order listed with specificity the issues that the NCRALP
was instructed to take up.
52. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND
PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL 324 (1979). The
two volumes of the Report are available in Antitrust Division conventional
reading room in paper copy and at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/foiaroom.htm.
53. The budget for the NCRALP was $217,000, to cover travel, consultants,
printing and other operating costs. Commissioners were not compensated and
staff members were already employed by DOJ. The project actually came in
below budget.
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Commission held four meetings to reach a consensus on its
recommendations and the contents of the final report.54
What was accomplished? Probably the most important
contribution of the NCRALP was to underscore, at a pivotal
time, the desirability of continuing the nation's incipient
movement toward deregulation. The NCRALP spoke out
strongly for the principle of free market competition
protected by the antitrust laws, wherever feasible, and
made specific recommendations for a number of regulated
sectors, as well as stating principles of general applicability.
It endorsed legislation to require increased consideration of
competitive issues in regulatory decision making.
Also of importance was the NCRALP's conclusion that
complex antitrust cases could be handled better than in the
past through application of "best practices" and other
procedures that it spelled out. The final report included
numerous recommendations on judicial management and
control; the use of time limits to expedite litigation; the
channeling of discovery; methods for early focusing and
resolution of issues; sanctions and disincentives for dilatory
behavior; and the improvement of structural and
preliminary relief. None of these recommendations involved
other than technical legislative changes or modifications to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
NCRALP also looked at two substantive standards
relating to the Sherman Act. Specifically, it proposed an
amendment to section two to clarify that the "dangerous
probability of success" necessary to establish an illegal
attempt to monopolize does not require proof of a high
probability of actual monopoly, but rather a determination
of whether the defendant has significantly threatened
competition. No such change has been legislated.
The Commission also recommended that the
appropriate Congressional committees should undertake an
inquiry aimed at strengthening the ability of the Sherman
Act to deal with persistent monopoly power. No legislation
54. Despite the fact that NCRALP was established by Executive Order
rather than by legislation, the author recalls that most of the members,
including politicians from both parties, participated actively, especially in the
decision-making meetings. This contrasts with the TNEC, in which the
Chairman was apparently the only Member of Congress who showed consistent
interest. BRINKLEY, supra note 14, at 124.
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emerged and indeed the next Administration would almost
certainly have opposed such a project."
E. International Competition Advisory Committee
("ICPAC") (1998-2000)
The International Competition Advisory Committee
("ICPAC") was established by Attorney General Janet Reno
and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Joel I. Klein
in 1998. It was chaired by James F. Rill and Paula Stern,
one with an antitrust background, the other with a trade
background. There were ten members. 6 The Executive
Director was Merit E. Janow of Columbia University.
ICPAC held two sets of public hearings, including as
witnesses senior competition officials from around the
world and business, legal, and trade associations who
reported on the findings of special tasks forces. There was
also outreach through surveys. Taking advantage of new
technology, the full proceedings were available to the public
on a Web site. The Report was presented on February 28,
2000, in the form of a bound book with 302 pages of text
and six annexes."
55. Richard Posner castigates the Neal Task Force proposal, and by
implication other similar proposals aimed at legislating limitations on
concentration, saying, "[tioday it would be regarded, including by its principal
authors, as completely off the wall. The two fundamental reasons are the
growth of faith in the robustness, the efficiency, and the self-correcting
tendencies of the free market and the growth of skepticism about the efficacy of
ambitious governmental interventions in the economy." POSNER, supra note 47,
at 117. I cite this as illustrative of the way in which thinking about antitrust
can change from one political regime to the next, as both ideology and what we
believe to be true changes. One function of an antitrust study commission could
be to help clarify what the principal schools believe at a certain moment in
time.
56. Zoe Baird, Thomas E. Donilon, John T. Dunlop, Eleanor M. Fox,
Raymond V. Gilmartin, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Steven Rattner, Richard P.
Simmons, G. Richard Thoman, and David B. Yoffie. Represented were U.S.
business, industrial relations, academic, economic, and legal communities.
57. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST: FINAL REPORT (2000). The Report contains
six chapters: (1) Globalization and its implications for antitrust cooperation and
enforcement; (2) Multijurisdictional mergers: facilitating substantive
convergence and minimizing conflict; (3) Multijurisdictional mergers:
rationalizing the merger review process through targeted reform; (4)
International anticartel enforcement and interagency enforcement cooperation;
(5) Where trade and competition intersect; and (6) Preparing for the future.
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The Report is a comprehensive document, full of factual
information and discussion of issues large and small. Its
most important effect, thus far, appears to be the launching
of the International Competition Network which is the
materialization of what the Report recommended as "the
Global Competition Initiative"-"a new venue where
governmental officials, as well as private firms,
nongovernmental organizations and others can exchange
ideas and work towards common solutions of competition
law and policy problems."58
III. SOME COMPARISONS OF BLUE RIBBON ANTITRUST
COMMISSIONS
These six different schemes offer a variety of interesting
comparisons. AMC can be visualized as the uncontroversial
child of a single Congressional Committee Chairman, in
response to a general sense that important aspects of the
economy had changed and that the nation should therefore
determine whether the antitrust laws need reform. While
AMC has no obvious political opposition, it also appears to
lack intensive or widespread support within or without the
Congress. Its proposed makeup is structured to be evenly
balanced between the major political parties, with
membership likely to be characterized by expertise
(necessarily colored by ideology) rather than partisanship.
TNEC's genesis was the Great Depression and the
urgent national quandary as to what direction government
policy should take. Both the President and the Congress
were engaged in the shaping of the TNEC, whose balancing
focused not so much on partisan politics as on assuring an
equal role for the executive and the legislative branches. In
fact, the executive branch played much the stronger role.
The next four antitrust study undertakings were not
statutory, but executive initiatives, in each case emanating
from the Attorney General or the White House. The 1955
National Committee and the 1967 Task Force seemed to
respond less to economic crisis than to a vague sense that
the economy was moving along, changes had occurred, and
it was time to take another look at the antitrust laws.
Today's Antitrust Modernization Commission shares this
heritage of responding to a vague awareness of change,
58. Id. at 29.
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although its genesis is the Congressional rather than the
Executive Branch.
NCRALP, established approximately ten years after the
Neal Report, represents yet a third story. It was the
brainchild of the Executive Branch, responding both to
growing concerns arising largely out of United States v.
International Business Machines Corp.," a particularly
unwieldy monopolization suit, that something needed to be
done with "big" antitrust cases, and also to the opportunity
for generating expert and political support for an important
new de-regulatory direction, already off to a start in the
airline industry. The makeup of the NCRALP combined
politicians who would in theory be able to convert the final
recommendations into legislation with experts from within
and without the government.
ICPAC, in the late 1990s, was even more sharply
delimited in its mission than NCRALP. Initiated by the
Attorney General, it responded to dramatic increases in
world trade, the creation of new market economies
throughout the world, and the increasing complexity of
adopting antitrust ideas and institutions to these changes.
Two different models emerge from this overview. One
model might be called landscaping: TNEC, the 1955
National Committee, and the 1967 Task Force were
designed to review the general landscape and propose any
needed changes. The alternative model might be called
targeting: NCRALP and ICPAC had assignments that were
more carefully delimited. The AMC on paper seems to more
closely resemble the landscaping model. That is, the
proposed timeframe of three years and budget of four
million dollars, should give it ample time and resources to
build a substantial record, and the lack of pre-determined
direction places it in the tradition of the TNEC, with a
principal difference being that it comes into being as a blue-
ribbon body of experts with no Members of Congress
participating.
In terms of output, TNEC produced its many-volumes of
testimony and monographs, which are much-praised and
provided the information that fed into many later
developments, including the historic Celler-Kefauver
Amendment to the Clayton Act. But the recommendations
of the TNEC themselves were considered to be of relatively
59. 475 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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little importance. The 1955 and 1967 efforts also had little
direct legislative impact. The NCRALP, by comparison to
TNEC, produced only two relatively slender volumes,
helped stave off incipient efforts to undermine "big case"
litigation, and contr.buted to the de-regulation movement.
But NCRALP, even with many influential politicians as
members, did not lead to any significant legislation.
What can be predicted for the AMC? Lacking a political
membership, a particular constituency, or a compelling
need, it would seem unlikely that the AMC will be any more
successful than its predecessors at giving birth to specific
legislative proposals that will be rushed into law. Of course,
the scenery can change dramatically in three years. The
current economic doldrums could degenerate into a full-
blown depression. International relations could become so
acrimonious that global antitrust progress grinds to a halt,
even as the number of serious antitrust regimes multiplies.
Intellectual property could continue to expand its role at
the expense of antitrust law. It is just possible that the
AMC could be at the right place at the right time to make a
legislative difference.
But, it is important not to overemphasize legislation as
an objective. TNEC teaches us the value of periodically
taking an inventory of what we know about our economy. It
would be a proud accomplishment of AMC if it could answer
three questions: (1) What role does competition currently
play in our economy? (2) How has this changed since the
TNEC Report and what can we predict? And (3) what, if
any, reforms are appropriate to reflect these changes?
IV. A PROCESS FOR THE AMC
In the next section, I lay out a proposed modus operandi
for the AMC. The final section contains my suggestions for
the substantive program of the Commission.
A. Phasing the Work
There are, of course, many different ways in which the
AMC could proceed. My proposal is that it adopt a plan of
operation with four distinct phases: (1) Initial Agenda
Building and General Fact Gathering, (2) Targeted Fact
Gathering, (3) Public Policy Analysis, and (4) Report
Writing. The first three phases would invite participation
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by specific witnesses, supplemented by written submissions
from anyone else. The Internet should be used to assure the
widest knowledge of the AMC's activities.
Phase One could be targeted for six months, during
which period the administrative structure would be put into
place, rules of procedures would be adopted, and the
members would determine the overall agenda. Witnesses
would present suggested topics, much as I will do in the
final section of this Essay, but in greater detail, with
justifications. The agenda should be formulated as a series
of questions that are capable of being answered within the
life of the AMC. (The most difficult task will likely be to
decide what questions not to pursue.) While the agenda is
being considered, staff can begin assembling factual
material of a background nature.
Phase Two could be. targeted for the next sixteen
months. The objective is to pull in a wide range of
potentially relevant facts, a la TNEC, in order to answer
specific questions adopted in the agenda.
Phase Three would take up the next six months of the
Commission's life. In this phase, testimony would be taken
on the public policy implications of the evidence compiled in
the first two phases.
Phase Four, lasting the final eight months (including
two months at the end for completing the drafting and
editing of the Final Report), would be allotted to
preparation of the report of the Commission. This would
entail: (1) completing assemblage of the principal findings
of fact, (2) laying out a summary of the public policy
discussions, fairly presenting all sides, (3) debating and
voting on recommendations, and (4) reporting the
Commission's findings of fact, majority recommendations
and minority statements.
B. A Proposed Substantive Agenda for Investigation
At the end of Phase One, the AMC would define the
principal areas of investigation it wants to pursue. Here is
my personal preliminary list of ten topics (with some
subsidiary questions) to be investigated. My list begins with
the more contextual topics and moves toward more specific
antitrust topics. I have not attempted to suggest the types
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obtained in the course of this inquiry.
60
1. Changes in the economy since TNEC. Begin by
putting the present into perspective. Then, answer
questions including: How have the roles of the following
factors changed: big business, small business, organized
labor, trade associations, corporate governance,
concentration of wealth, international trade, major sectors
of the economy?
2. Aggregate measures of concentration. Look at the
past, present, and likely trends. Examples of such trends
include: Is the economy as a whole becoming more or less
concentrated? What about different industrial sectors?
What role is played by convergence of industrial sectors?
What have been the causes of changes in aggregate
measures of concentration?
3. Market concentration. Again, look at the past and
present trends, focusing this time on a variety of narrowly
defined (antitrust) markets. The antitrust agencies could
pull this information from their investigatory files to
compile a comprehensive profile. Examples of such trends
include: What have been the causes of changes in market
concentration?
4. Measures of economic performance. By various
measures (including profits, prices, innovativeness, and
productivity), how has the performance of the economy
changed, in terms that throw light on the effectiveness of
competition? What do we know about the relative efficiency
60. However, to provide examples of what I have in mind for Phase Two:
What role should market concentration play in merger analysis? In what ways
should efficiencies be taken into account in antitrust analysis? Has intellectual
property become an anticompetitive factor? Does the growth of network
industries require any change in antitrust policy or analysis? When should price
discrimination be considered an antitrust issue? What should be the priorities
of antitrust-taking into account such historic objectives as keeping prices low,
increasing productivity, providing consumers with a reasonable range of
choices, stimulating innovation, providing a level playing field to competitors,
and combating centralized economic power? Are the criminal penalties
sufficiently severe? Should the U.S. support efforts to have an international
antitrust regime? Is the mix of antitrust and regulation working well in
transitions from regulation to competition?
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of differently sized and differently structured
organizations?
5. Technological change. In what ways are technological
changes (e.g., computers, telecommunications,
transportation) affecting competition? How has the creation
of network industries affected competition? How has the
relationship between antitrust and intellectual property
changed?
6. The regulatory environment. In what ways are
changes in the regulatory environment (e.g., deregulation of
sectors, liberalization of international trade, governmental
policies involving intellectual property, taxation, securities,
state regulation) affecting competition? How has the
relationship between antitrust and sectoral regulation
changed?
7. Globalization. How do the expansion of transnational
commerce and the development of antitrust regimes around
the world affect U.S. competition? How has the relationship
between antitrust and trade regulation changed?
8. Business strategy. What changes are occurring with
respect to the way businesses conduct themselves as
competitors? Examples of such changes may include, but
would not be limited to, mergers, joint ventures and
alliances, power buying, vertical integration or
disintegration, information sharing through trade
associations and internet, leveraging of market power, price
discrimination, and standard setting.
9. Antitrust administration and process. The AMC
should review measures of resources and effectiveness of
antitrust (federal, state, and private) over time. Such
measures include: What types of impact evaluation are
available and what do they suggest?
10. Antitrust enforcement policies. The AMC should
describe ways in which antitrust enforcement policy has
changed over time. Such changes include: What types of
mergers, single-firm, and multi-firm activities have or have
not been challenged? How have criminal penalties changed?
In what ways have civil remedies changed?
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CONCLUSION
Executed diligently by a capable Commission and high
quality staff, the process described above could result in a
landmark study that would form the basis for fact-based
policy recommendations and intelligent formulation of later
legislative initiatives. Like the TNEC, it would be an
authoritative reference on many issues relating to
competition policy for years to come. But based on past
experience, it would be a mistake to gear the inquiry
toward near-term legislation. Prior blue ribbon antitrust
study commissions (even those with political leaders
participating) have not generated much or important
immediate legislation, but at their best have contributed to
the on-going national dialogue about the role of competition
in our economy, clarifying what is generally accepted and
what is open to debate. Given the multitude of questions
that are today being asked about antitrust, both by
advocates of more and advocates of less enforcement, this
type of clarification will more likely than not be useful.

